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Abstract 
The paper is an attempt to analyse the likely effects of compensatory social programmes such 
as Misiones Bolivarianas on community organisations in barrios and their participation in the 
planning and implementation of barrio upgrading projects, based on the case of the CAMEBA 
project in Caracas, Venezuela. 
The low level of community (target group) participation in Project CAMEBA has been 
compounded by a profoundly paternalistic approach of the national government that promised 
immediate relief and benefits in the form of compensatory programmes thus reinforcing 
habitual dependency amongst the poor people. These immediate-benefit programmes seem to 
have had an inhibiting effect on the community organisation and participation in the upgrading 
project, which had long term objectives and had aspired to create sustainable self-reliant 
communities in the project’s intervention areas. Such conclusion is reinforced by the results of 
the survey, which clearly shows that the awareness of the community regarding compensatory 
programmes is by and large greater than that of the upgrading project, even though project 
CAMEBA implementation started about four years before the apperance of the Misiones 
Bolivarianas. 
This situation has somehow hindered the process of community organisation which in any case 
involves training of communities to be legitimate and autonomous by getting rid of their 
chronic dependency syndrome.   
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The Country 
Venezuela, a country of 25 million people and rich in oil resources is situated in the northern 
part of South America facing the Caribbean Sea. Venezuela is one of the most urbanised 
countries in the region with 88% of the population inhabiting urban areas. Caracas, the capital 
city with a population of 3.2 million accounts for about 15% of the country’s urban population 
(INE 2004) and continues to be the centre of economic, social, military and political power.  
 
Barrios: The Need for Integration 
Unregulated and rapid urbanisation in Venezuela like elsewhere in the developing world, has 
led to mushrooming of informal settlements called barrios which are built by the inhabitants 
themselves outside the formal urban regulatory framework. Barrios are characterised by 
precarious housing, poor basic services, low quality of living conditions, spatial segregation, 
and social exclusion. Barrios are the spatial translation of urban poverty. All these 
characteristics underline the need for integrating barrio communities to the urban dynamics of 
the mainstream city, in order to create a more inclusive city and a society at large. It is 
estimated that in the metropolitan area of Caracas alone, there are 317 barrios forming 14 
barrio agglomerations distributed across the city, occupying 3,446 ha and accommodating 
around 1,002,780 poor (Villanueva and Baldó 1995) (See Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Barrio agglomeration east of Caracas in Petare Norte 
 
Source: Alonso Ayala, 2005 
 
Empirical studies on urban informal growth usually tend to highlight the lack of physical and 
social infrastructure as the main problem of barrios. This paper, however, assumes that the 
barrio problem is not merely physical or spatial but has multiple dimensions such as social, 
economic, environmental and political.  Further, it assumes that cities can become more 
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inclusive only when the poor people at the grass roots organise themselves and participate 
proactively in the development process.  
 
Barrio Upgrading Projects in Venezuela 
In Venezuela barrios were never formally considered as part of urban planning before the 
1980s. In Caracas the extensive areas occupied by barrios, in some cases dating back as far as 
the 1920s but mostly since the 1960s, were portrayed as green areas or sites for future 
development in urban (master) plans and blueprints. The recognition of barrios as part of 
Urban Development Plans was only partially reflected in the urban development policy of 
Venezuela through the Ley Orgánica de Ordenación Urbanística (LOOU) of 1987. Considering the 
scale of the housing problem reflected by the prevalence of urban informal settlements, it is 
surprising that the above mentioned law just devoted one small section to the issue (Art. 49) 
providing as the planning instrument the so-called Special Plans. These plans do not only 
include barrios but also historical, architectonical, and environmental conservation areas, zones 
of touristic interest, and any other area whose conditions deserve a separate treatment within 
the Local Development Plan. Nevertheless this event marked the beginning of a new 
perspective on interventions in informal settlements. The most important outcome of this 
policy was a metropolitan-wide barrio integration1 plan called Plan Sectorial para la 
Incorporación de los Barrios a la Estructura Urbana del Area Metropolitana de Caracas y de la 
Región Central2 in 1994 formulated by the National Housing Council (Baldó & Villanueva 1995).   
Based on this plan, an agreement for financial assistance was signed between the Government 
of Venezuela and the World Bank in 1998 for the implementation of Project CAMEBA (Caracas 
Barrio Upgrading), the largest ever slum upgrading project envisioned in the country. Project 
CAMEBA had three main components: urban physical upgrading, including land regularization 
(see Figure 2); strengthening of municipal institutions; and house unit upgrading through a 
microcredit programme. One of the major objectives of the project was to establish a 
programme called ‘Social Accompaniment’ that aimed at fostering community participation 
during the entire project cycle through the creation of specific community-based organisations.  
The commencement of Project CAMEBA was delayed due to a landmark change in the 
country’s political and administrative regime led by Hugo Chavez who assumed the Office of 
                                                
1 Integration in the plan refers mainly to functional and physical integration of informal settlements to the 
formal structure of the urban environment to which they belong. The plan also considered socio- 
economic aspects of integration such as community organisation and land regularisation. 
2 “Sectoral Plan for the Incorporation of Barrios into the Urban Structure of the Metropolitan Area of 
Caracas and the Central Region” 
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President in 1998.  The country was in the midst of political instability driven by major shifts in 
public policy and managerial changes. The new policy changes were, to some extent in conflict 
with the Project CAMEBA partly financed by the World Bank (Falconer 2005). Though the 
implementation of CAMEBA officially commenced in December 1999 it gained momentum only 
during the second half of 2003 coinciding with the launch of Misiones. Several management 
turnovers, institutional changes and political conflicts such as the three months long oil strike 
between December 2002 and February 2003 determined the slow implementation of CAMEBA 
at the inception phase.  
Figure 2: Road construction work by CAMEBA 
 
Source: Alonso Ayala, 2005 
 
The New Constitution: A Bolivarian Revolution through Participatory Democracy 
The new Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela framed in 1999 envisioned a 
major change in the governance of the country from a representative form to a participatory 
democracy. The political parties that had ruled the country during the last forty years were 
blamed for the widespread poverty and backwardness of the country characterised by rampant 
corruption in pubic life, inequality and exclusion of the poor from the mainstream 
development. The new Constitution exhorted the poorest of the poor particularly those living in 
barrios to proactively participate in the endeavour of building a new nation founded on social 
justice (Perez 2005). The Bolivarian Revolution envisaged political empowerment of people 
through community organisations in order to foster social justice and inclusion. The process of 
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creating community organisations received a political fillip in the year 2003, when the 
government operationalised its country wide social development policy called as the Misiones 
Bolivarianas (Bolivarian Misiones). Several misiones were implemented throughout barrios 
such as the construction of primary health care centres, the operationalisation in selected 
houses of communal kitchens for malnourished children, pregnant women, the elderly and 
physical impaired and adult literacy programmes.  
 
Misiones Bolivarianas: A Formula for Fast Track Development? 
According to the Venezuelan Ministry of Communications and Information, the Bolivarian 
Misiones were created in 2003 with the aim of deepening the Bolivarian Revolution and 
consolidating participatory democracy. The discourse on social justice was translated into 
public domain in the form of Bolivarian Misiones to function as quasi organisations outside the 
purview of public institutions. Their primary goal is to tackle the causes and consequences of 
poverty and exclusion, through pro-active participation of the people (MCI 2006). The two main 
objectives of the Misiones were: to achieve universal enfranchisement of human rights; and to 
promote active participation of the barrio inhabitants through community-based organisations 
for steering the mass implementation of the new social programmes. Misiones were 
iconceived as an operative mechanism to penetrate barrios and assist them in accessing 
various services as primary health and education (D’Elia et al 2006). The barrios became the 
core spatial entities for fast track implementation of the government‘s new social ideology 
embodied in the Misiones (See Figure 3).  
 
IHS Working Papaer 21 Ayala Aleman Community organisations misiones and integration of Barrios of Caracas 7
Figure 3: Primary health care module of Mision Barrio Adentro  
 
Source: Alonso Ayala, 2005 
 
Misiones and Community Organisations 
It seems the Misiones have had an inclusive and empowering effect on the poor who for the 
first time are feeling important in the process of nation building (Cartaya 2007). Misiones were 
operationalised in barrios through the creation of community structures in the form of 
committees to intervene in various social sectors such as health, education, culture, sports, etc. 
Organizing the barrio communities into mission committees was facilitated by the Bolivarian 
Circles that were created in 2002 to disseminate the ideology of the Bolivarian Revolution, 
defend democracy and foster people’s participation at the grassroots (Chávez et al 2003). 
An evaluation of the performance of the various Misiones compiled by Vanessa Cartaya (2007) 
points out that the objective of universal enfranchisement of rights has been driven by political 
loyalty. PROVEA (2005) reports that exclusion of certain people from deriving benefits out of 
the Misiones has been an act of political discrimination. Estaba et al. (2006) argue that parallel 
structures have been created for the execution of the Mission driven programmes, while the 
problems of the public sector continues to persist due to lack of structural reforms whereas 
policies aimed at achieving social justice have attained the form of compensatory 
programmes3.  
                                                
3 In the context of this article compensatory programmes are those programmes which are remedial in 
nature because they attack the consequences of poverty rather than the causes. These programmes should 
be temporary, allowing to develop and implement the necessary structural changes to pressing 
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The legitimacy of people’s participation in the process which was the second major objective of 
Misiones has also been questioned. According to D’Elia et al. (2006) participation has been 
undermined by two major factors. Firstly, clientelistic relations are being forged with 
communities to create vote banks and gain political support by using social assistance 
programmes in selective ways. Secondly, the non transparent and preferential manner in which 
community committees have been created using the politically manipulative Misiones has 
given rise to serious doubts about the legitimacy of their empowerment and autonomy in 
steering social programmes. 
And yet, it appears that the Misiones-driven community committees have succeeded in 
creating a strong sense of ownership and belonging amongst barrio inhabitants (Lacruz 2006). 
The government too has proclaimed that “Misiones has been absolutely successful in reaching 
out to the socially excluded and benefiting them through a wide range of social programmes in 
the areas of education, science and culture, primary health, food security, employment, social 
economy, and social assistance”. The success of the Misiones is attributed to the participation 
of the organised communities and their role in social monitoring to make the public 
administration accountable (Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comunicación y la 
Información, 2007).   
 
Research Methodology 
The field research was focused on analysing the impacts of Project CAMEBA on the 
socioeconomic and spatial integration of the barrio communities in the context of Misiones 
Bolivarianas4. The study area chosen was the barrio agglomeration of Julián Blanco consisting 
of nine barrios located in Petare Norte with about 7,800 households (see Fig. 4). The empirical 
study was mainly based on a survey of a representative sample of 130 households using a 
standardised questionnaire. Three focus group discussions were conducted to further validate 
the findings of the survey. Throughout the field research phase, several structured and semi-
structured key informant interviews were held to capture the intricacies of barrio life in the 
light of project CAMEBA.  Secondary sources of data such as articles and papers related to the 
socio-political situation of the country were analysed to supplement the empirical research.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
development issues such as access to adequate health and education services, social security and 
employment opportunities.    
4 This paper draws its conclusions from a research project conducted in Caracas between 
November 2004 and April 2007, which aimed at evaluating the impact of the project CAMEBA in 
terms of integrating barrios to the city from a spatial and socio-economic perspective. 
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Figure 4: Barrio agglomeration of Petare Norte and location of study area Julian Blanco  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Petare Norte
Julian Blanco
 
Source: Salomon Construcciones C.A. (2000) 
 
Community Organisations, Political Context and Project CAMEBA  
Communities of barrios and the poor in general, who have been victims of a  political tradition 
of unfulfilled promises and manipulation are known to have acquired a heightened sense of 
suspicion about any new external intervention, be it by the government or otherwise.  In 
addition, the low level of self esteem prevalent amongst communities shaped by a prolonged 
process of exclusion has been a formidable barrier to sustainable social organisation and 
community self help projects (Barroso, 1997). The physical interventions in barrio had always 
followed a piece-meal approach with low quality standards sans community involvement to 
which the barrio inhabitants had often reacted with a sense of rejection and indifference 
(Bolívar 1998; 2006). Prior to the onset of Project CAMEBA, the communities in Julián Blanco 
were already informally organised as neighbourhood associations, and even though their focus 
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was not necessarily or exclusively on physical upgrading, one major purpose was anyway to 
improve their living environment.  
Given this background, the communities’ perception of the efforts by the staff of Project 
CAMEBA to create a new community organisation in order to comply with the project 
requirements was filled with mistrust and a sense of being imposed with a new organisation. It 
was in this context that a group of researchers and academics at the Universidad Central de 
Venezuela, who had been working in Barrio Julián Blanco since 1996, intervened and convinced 
the community to create a formal organisation5 aimed at preparing, managing and 
implementing a house upgrading project for their barrio as part of project CAMEBA (Bolívar 
2006).  
Together with the technical staff of project CAMEBA, the members of the newly formed 
community organisation prioritised the needs and types of interventions. The university group 
again played a major role in creating the conditions necessary to build trust between the 
technical staff and the community by ensuring that they interacted with barrio inhabitants, 
walked through the barrio along with people and explained the project proposal to them to 
evolve a detailed blue-print of the upgrading project that was eventually finalized in the year 
2001 (Bolívar 2006). 
Meanwhile, in the year 1999, the newly elected government enacted a new law on housing that 
recognised and included urban and house upgrading projects for barrios and social housing 
schemes. It was the first time ever that barrio upgrading was included in the housing law of 
the country formulated by the National Housing Council. As part of the institutional 
arrangement to implement the new law it was mandatory to set up Local Offices for Technical 
Assistance (LOTA) in those barrios that were selected for upgrading projects.   The main tasks 
of LOTA were to establish a link between the barrio community organisations and the technical 
staff and to provide support and assistance to the housing upgrading process. LOTA was set 
up in Julian Blanco in the year 2000.  
All the preparations were in place for the implementation of CAMEBA in Julián Blanco –
community organisation had been created, the blue print for action was approved and LOTA 
had been set up. Though LOTA was a pilot exercise, operationalising it on a full scale 
experienced a major setback when the President of the National Housing Council (NHC) was 
removed from her office by the President of Venezuela. According to the former Vice-Minister 
                                                
5 This organisation was registered in October 2000 under the name “Promotion Force of Barrio 
Julian Blanco Civil Association” (Asociación Civil Fuerza Promotora del Barrio Julián Blanco)  
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of Infrastructure and Urban Development, the main reason for removing the President of the 
NHC was that the new political culture did not believe in barrio upgrading but in the direct 
provision of the State of so-called “dignified housing”. Therefore, barrios should be eliminated 
and people should be housed in new housing built preferably in depopulated areas. 
Subsequently, the operations of LOTAs were also suspended in 2001. This affected the 
community in Julian Blanco severely as their renewed hopes of a decent house drew blank yet 
another time, though CAMEBA had already implemented a few components of the upgrading 
project. However, an even more severe fallout of these developments was related to the 
community organisation which has shown signs of disintegration (Interview with a Julián 
Blanco barrio leader and member of the Civil Association 2005)  
Given its tentative approach to community participation, Project CAMEBA was anyway ridden 
with problems of its own since it was not fully grounded in the realities of barrio life. In the 
ensuing years, the implementation of CAMEBA faced more hurdles owing to some events that 
created political turmoil in the country such as the Presidential coup in April 2002, a nation-
wide strike by both private and public sector employees in 2002-03 and a national referendum 
to decide if the government should continue ruling.  
Key Findings 
Ever since Venezuela became a Constitutional democracy at the end of the 1950s, the approach 
to poverty eradication has been driven by charity and compensatory programmes. Such an 
approach has only strengthened the deep rooted dependency of barrio communities on 
populist measures. Upgrading of urban informal settlements, as conceptualized in the current 
development practice, has only a recent history in Venezuela. Against the backdrop of an 
ongoing debate within the country’s political fraternity, the upgrading projects are being 
subjected to conflicting approaches which are driven, on the one hand, by political patronage, 
and on the other by sheer technical expertise.  
Community Awareness of CAMEBA  
The survey findings revealed that 56% (N=130) of the respondents were aware of the term 
CAMEBA.  During the focus group discussions (Barrio Julián Blanco 2005 and 2006; Barrio Vista 
Hermosa 2005; Barrio Bolivar 2006) the general feeling of discussants was that “CAMEBA was 
there doing something” particularly in relation to visible interventions like construction of 
roads and retaining walls that were perceived as ‘good’ for the barrio.  
Community Participation in CAMEBA 
One of the salient goals of CAMEBA was to mobilise community organisation and participation 
in both project planning and implementation. Out of those who were aware of the term 
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CAMEBA (N=64) only 56% reported having participated in the planning phase, and 20% in the 
process of implementation of the project. To a question on whether they participated in any 
community meeting related to CAMEBA, about 50% (N=64) of the respondents answered in 
the affirmative.  
For a community that is used to live on hope and gifts doled out by the government as a show 
of patronage, participation is inseparably linked to expectations of immediate material 
benefits. Therefore, participation levels were high at the start of the upgrading project cycle 
and declining over time as the community grew to realise that no immediate benefits are 
forthcoming (focus group discussion in Julián Blanco, 2005; interview with barrio leader in Julián 
Blanco, 2005). It is interesting to note that all those involved in one or the other project 
activities were women. This is also substantiated by one of the survey findings where 69% 
(N=130) of the respondents stated that women in general participate more than men in 
community activities. One of the major reasons for this could be that women spend more time 
than men in the barrio as mothers and housewives and are affected far more by the quality of 
community infrastructure and public services.   
Though one segment of the community understands integration as a reciprocal process where 
community organisation is envisaged to play a major role, a majority of the members are driven 
by short sightedness. Even when upgrading measures such as retaining walls and paving of 
streets aimed at improving the physical living conditions in barrios were being implemented 
right in front of their houses, most inhabitants neither paid attention to them nor were aware 
of the intentions of the upgrading project (observations made during the implementation of 
the survey in UDU 4.4. Julián Blanco, 2005). This corroborates the findings from the focus 
group discussions that a culture of voluntarism and participation is practically non-existent in 
the barrio under study. The residents’ feedback also reveals that participation demands a great 
deal of time, effort and financial resources, which poor people find an additional burden in their 
eternal struggle to secure urban livelihoods.  
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Community Organisation and CAMEBA 
Respondents were asked if they belonged to a community organisation created by any 
upgrading project or government programme, and an overwhelming 92 % (N=130) of the 
respondent answered negatively. Twelve of those who responded affirmatively declared to 
belong to an organisation created by a mission, of which four said they belonged also to a 
neighbourhood association, and three of them belonged to a neighbourhood association 
exclusively. Only one person admitted belonging to a community organisation from CAMEBA. 
CAMEBA staff in-charge of project management revealed that their task was rendered difficult 
due to lack of well established community organisations. Since deeper participation of the 
community in upgrading projects was not coming forth, alternatives had to be sought. 
Construction work was awarded to sub-contractors, which were bound to hire at least 70% of 
the labour force from the barrio itself. Local community members had to be trained and 
employed as inspectors to inspect the status of the works and report to the community 
(Interviews with CAMEBA Project Manager for Petare Norte, CAMEBA Project Director and 
construction site engineer, 2006). It appears that the community could not be motivated 
enough to play a proactive role in CAMEBA. 
It is crucial to note that even after eight years since the commencement of implementation of 
the CAMEBA project in Julián Blanco, not a single self-reliant community organisation has been 
created for the purpose of steering the upgrading project. During initial years of the project, 
there was greater participation of residents owing to raised expectations. In the following 
years, however, participation declined drastically since the project components being 
implemented were perceived as scattered, insufficient and devoid of immediate benefits. 
Currently, only a few organisations are active, run by a handful of community leaders (including 
the Civil Association). Interviews with some of them revealed that the tendency is towards low 
levels of participation (interviews with Sra. BM and Sra. MH in the Barrio Julián Blanco; with Sr. 
JC in Sector La Montañita; with Sra. ME in the Barrio Bolívar, and with Sr. SG in Sector Vista 
Hermosa 2005 - 2006). 
Community’s Disappointment with CAMEBA 
During one of the ‘ study walks’ in a CAMEBA-intervened barrio called Vista Hermosa (2005), 
with a group of women and the president of the local neighbourhood association, it was 
observed that houses had problems due to water leakage resulting from lack of proper 
underground drainage and sewerage even after those facilities were supposedly upgraded 
under CAMEBA. People were generally disappointed with the quality of some of the public 
works such as construction of staircase, storm water drains and sewerage connections as they 
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were already showing signs of deterioration. The problem has worsened due to negligence of 
community members who continue to dispose garbage and litter into the storm water drains. 
This indicates that CAMEBA did not fully comprehend the barrio realities and its failure to 
educate the community on the importance of maintaining the physical infrastructure.  
The Conflicting Effects of CAMEBA and Misiones 
Apart from the land regularisation component of CAMEBA which had to co-ordinate with the 
Urban Land Committee of the Misiones, the two programmes had nothing in common.  It was 
the task of the Urban Land Committees to do a household survey of barrios based on which the 
decision to regularise land would be made. In the barrio agglomeration of Julian Blanco the 
status in 2006 was that people were yet to obtain title deeds to the land whereas people in 
other barrios in Petare Norte have already obtained theirs (status in 2006).  
Transition from CAMEBA to Misiones – the translation of disappointment into hope 
The most important observation during the study-walk in barrio Vista Hermosa was however, 
related to the way people’s disappointment with CAMEBA was fast translating into hope in the 
Misiones, as revealed by a group of women who stated their intention to organise the 
community into committees as urged upon by the national government. For these women, the 
creation of Mission committees (health, education, sports, culture etc) appeared to be the only 
hope to obtain government intervention to resolve community problems and educate people 
about the importance of community life.  
High community awareness of Misiones vs. low community awareness of CAMEBA 
In contrast to the 56% awareness rating of CAMEBA, the rating for both national and 
municipal Misiones was 97%, though Misiones were launched only in 2003, whereas CAMEBA 
had been in operation since 1999. This is an indication of the propensity of the public 
communication campaign of the national government. Those who were aware of Misiones 
recalled on average the names of three Misiones. Most prominent amongst the recalled 
Misiones were: Mision Rivas and Mision Robinson (for education and literacy), Barrio Adentro 
(health) and MERCAL (subsidized food market).  
Only 12% (N=130) of the respondents said they belonged to a community organisation of which 
75% (N= 16) said they were affiliated to community structures created by the Misiones such as 
Urban Land Committee, Community Kitchen, and Health Committees. 
Immediate benefits of Misiones vs. long term effects of CAMEBA 
The low level of community (target group) participation in CAMEBA has been compounded by a 
profoundly paternalistic approach of the national government that promised immediate relief 
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and benefits in the form of compensatory programmes such as Misiones thus reinforcing 
habitual dependency amongst the poor people. The various Misiones Bolivarianas, being rather 
innovative compared to their counterparts  in the past regimes prescribe quick-fix solutions to 
pressing problems, e.g. creating a community kitchen which employs women in barrios to 
provide free meals to all single mothers in extreme poverty, handicapped persons, children with 
malnutrition and to the elderly. These immediate-benefit programmes seem to have had an 
inhibiting effect on the community organisation and participation in a project like CAMEBA 
which had long term objectives and had aspired to create sustainable self-reliant communities 
in the project areas.  
Lessons-learnt and perceptions of CAMEBA  implementers 
Although it is generally perceived that CAMEBA has not brought about a substantial change in 
the living conditions of the barrio, some community members as well as the project staff, 
particularly those working at the grass roots, do believe that CAMEBA was on the right track 
towards a positive change. The project staff attributed the limited success to their 
commitment and active participation. There was a positive sentiment about CAMEBA that 
“something has been achieved” and “some lessons have been learnt”. At the same time, they 
also acknowledged the serious gaps between planning on paper and the reality of the barrio. 
They attributed these shortcomings to the widely practiced politics of patronage and the 
concomitant culture of short sightedness and pursuance of immediate gains on the part of the 
“patronised” communities. This puts the spotlight back on the earlier critique that adequate 
efforts and resources are not being invested to understand the cultural ethos and behavioural 
patterns prevalent in the barrio. 
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Conclusions 
In the light of the findings presented in this paper, it would only be fair to state that Project 
CAMEBA cannot be solely blamed for the observed low level of community participation as the 
prevalent community habits and behaviours are equally responsible. Such habits have been 
shaped to a large extent by the “patronage culture” of political parties and ruling governments. 
In these circumstances the danger, however, is that participation can be  rendered passive, 
farcical and ceremonial where community members consent to projects by blindly signing the 
documents presented to them by officials 
Implementation of upgrading projects in barrios within the current political situation poses 
complex problems and challenges. Upgrading projects can meet their objectives only when they 
comprehend the cultural context in its entirety. They need to evolve mechanisms for inter 
institutional co-ordination to educate people about the long-term benefits as against 
expectations for immediate benefits in the form of compensatory programmes. 
The compensatory programmes of the government such as Misiones could be justified to some 
extent for their role in addressing life-threatening problems, but they must eventually do away 
with populism and create enabling conditions to deal effectively with structural problems of 
society and economy which are the root cause of poverty.  
The findings also point out that projects like CAMEBA, if implemented through full 
participation of the targeted beneficiaries, do have a reasonable potential to transcend into 
viable paths toward integration. But participation is not possible if a supportive community 
organisation is not in place. Participation must then be understood as an instrument for 
effective community organisation and management, and not as a ‘decreed must’ within the 
hollow ideal of constitutional democracy.  
There are reasons to believe that upgrading projects conceived within a sound participatory 
framework, where the community is involved both in the planning as well as in the 
implementation phase should gradually minimise the chronic dependency syndrome on the 
part of communities. A sound public awareness campaign explaining the goals, objectives and 
expected results of the project, together with capacity building of the community members for 
project planning and implementation must be introduced prior to project implementation, thus 
bridging the gap between professionals, government officials and barrio inhabitants. The 
stereotypical attitude that such a strategy premised upon active involvement of the 
communities from the very inception requires too much effort, time and funds, needs to 
change. 
IHS Working Papaer 21 Ayala Aleman Community organisations misiones and integration of Barrios of Caracas 17
Community inclusion and involvement is a precondition in the process of planning upgrading 
interventions, if they are to be sustained through time. However such an effort will not yield 
results if the community is not organised and does not work together as a cohesive reciprocal 
network and as a collective entity, or if efforts to organize the community are hampered by 
lopsided social policies and programmes that are not linked to the process of upgrading. It is of 
utmost importance to effectively tackle the self centeredness, apathy, cynicism and resigned 
attitude prevalent amongst the barrio inhabitants if the driving forces for positive changes are 
to be sustained. 
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